China Tests Domestic Satellite Communication in Arctic As Polar Capabilities Expand

China has demonstrated that its domestically developed GW satellite internet system can support communications during an Arctic expedition, adding another capability to a growing range of polar research, maritime information and shipping support. The test is an early step as part of the country’s planned global satellite network. 

During China’s 16th Arctic expedition this summer, the GW satellite constellation supported the country’s first video call linking three research vessels – Xue Long, Jidi, and Tan Suo 3 – with the Qinling station in Antarctica. The test was conducted in late September and reported publicly last week. It reportedly achieved a delay of less than one second with up- and downlink speeds of 30 megabits per second.

Subsequent tests aboard Jidi further demonstrated the systems capabilities by connecting to a test site along the Lhasa River on the Tibetan Plateau and China’s Ministry of Natural Resources. The trial also supported remote medical consultations, the transmission of oceanographic data and continuous support for ice forecasting platforms. 

Zhang Meng, an expedition member, explained that Jidi transmitted over 100 gigabytes in data across more than 40 video calls. 

“The tests have improved the ‘information isolation’ faced by polar expeditions offering practical evidence and experience for fully domestic communications support for China’s polar expeditions and marine equipment,” Zhang said.

China’s own constellation

The GW system, also known as Guowang, is China’s version of Elon Musk’s Starlink. The mega constellation is designed for close to 13,000 satellites across two categories: one orbiting below 500 kilometers and one at around 1,150 kilometers. Each section will consist of around 6,000-7,000 satellites.

Completion is aimed for 2035 with around 1,300 satellites expected to be in orbit by the end of 2029. Currently the system has around 230 satellites in orbit. 

Guowang remains at an early stage compared to Starlink, but the recent Arctic test represents a significant milestone showing that China now has the capability to deliver high-capacity coverage across the Arctic. 

China’s broader expansion

Chinese polar expeditions have previously relied in part on foreign commercial services, including the U.S.-based Iridium system and Britain’s Inmarsat. With Guowang China aims to reduce that reliance and give its researchers and vessel operators greater control over the transmission of data.

This latest test is also part of China’s broader expansion of Arctic information services. Research expeditions and remote sensing networks collect data on sea ice, ocean conditions and the polar environment; forecasting services turn some of that knowledge into operational information; and satellite communications help move data to remote vessels.

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In August, the Ministry of Transport announced that it will provide 72-hour Arctic sea ice forecasting through maritime communication channels for the first time this summer. The forecasts cover the East Siberian, Laptev and Kara Seas, including the key straits through those waters.

Ice forecasts are updated every 24 hours for  3 hour intervals across 10-kilometers grids. The service expands on navigation-information launched in 2024 which provided reports on observed conditions, rather than forecasts. The 72-hour service will allow for improved route planning. 

Part of a greater Arctic effort

A recent RAND Corporation report on China’s Economic, Scientific and Information Activities in the Arctic, specifically mentioned the country’s ongoing efforts to establish improved communication channels. 

“Data and information transmission activities present the clearest risks, having the potential to allow for intelligence collection, military applications, or threats to critical infrastructure,” the report concludes. It does, however, caution that “not all Chinese activities in the Arctic present the same level of risk and, accordingly, do not warrant the same level of scrutiny.” But “data and information transmission [...] are broad categories of activities with the most potential for military and intelligence threats.”

The Guowang test alone is not evidence of military application nor does it establish that China has yet achieved continuous Arctic coverage like Starlink. But it is nonetheless a further step establishing China’s interest in the region and adding domestic communications options that fold into expanding research and environmental monitoring efforts and increasing maritime activity.

New high-speed communications make these activities more connected and operationally useful.