Defence researcher: Putin is Gradually Raising our Tolerance For War

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February almost six years ago, so-called undesirable incidents between Europe and Russia have gradually increased.

Katarzyna Zysk, a professor at the Norwegian Defence University College's Institute for Defence Studies, calls it “salami tactics”.

“You cut off one thin slice at a time, until it becomes a new normal. The point is not to hide it. Each slice serves as a test of how much the opponent can tolerate without striking back, and whenever the costs imposed are not high enough, the boundary shifts,” says the defence researcher.

Additional costs

“Look at what has happened in Germany over the past three years, involving drones and explosives. In a different situation, it might have been described as an act of terrorism. If any of this had happened in the first year of the war, whether it was an attack involving drones or a missile, the reaction would probably have been stronger.”

Zysk says that Putin simply wants to impose costs on Europe without having to pay them himself.

“He is conditioning us to tolerate more,” says Zysk.

Where is the boundary?

HNN meets Katarzyna Zysk at the international Arctic Circle conference in Iceland, where she is taking part in panels and discussions on security and defence.

Among the debates are also discussions about the famous Article 5 threshold and where and when NATO should draw the line on what constitutes an attack on the defence alliance. A threshold that the defense alliance appears continually to push ahead of itself, entirely in line with Zysk’s salami theory.

"This gradual acclimatisation is taking place while there is still discussion about how NATO should respond. NATO then tries to be the ‘adult’ in this relationship. If NATO had reacted strongly to the first incident, would Russia then have escalated or backed down? It is difficult to know in hindsight."

Manageable cost

But what is clear, according to Zysk, is that Russia does not expect to pay an unacceptable high price for its aggression.

"After every serious incident, Russia presumably concludes that the cost is not high enough for it to stop."

Eventually, there will have been enough incidents for them to have a cumulative effect, Zysk believes.

Rhetoric

At some point, Russia may cross the threshold of what NATO will inevitably have to regard as an Article 5 incident. The question is what happens then.

Another point is that the incidents are described and handled differently. Some speak of incidents, others of attacks. But Europe is now increasingly converging on the terminology and understanding of developments.

“Western politicians are now more inclined to view this as part of warfare, as Russia has long viewed the situation,” says Zysk.

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Military doctrine

She refers to Russia’s 2014 military doctrine, which placed greater emphasis on non-military measures, such as information warfare and cyber operations. What they have in common is that they remain below the threshold of open military conflict.

“This way of thinking has long been part of Russian strategic thought. Many methods originate from the KGB and the Soviet era, while other approaches in Russian military theory can be traced back to the tsarist era. Today, Russia is exploiting the potential of technology and new forms of social interaction and communication. Since 2014, this has been done more systematically, in line with Russian military doctrine,” says Zysk.

The doctrine defines military conflicts as the integrated use of military force alongside economic, political and informational measures, and the exploitation of the population’s potential for protest.

There have been many such incidents, particularly since the annexation of Crimea.

“But the operations, especially over the past three years, have been considerably more daring.”

NATO has woken up

Where do you think NATO now draws the line when it comes to defending itself?

"It is incredibly difficult to say. Let us say that we experience a cyberattack that cuts off electricity to hospitals, and someone dies as a result. Or a missile attack in which lives are actually lost. What would NATO’s response then be? The cumulative effect of all the incidents or attacks must also be taken into account", the professor explains.

She says that an important element of Russian warfare below the threshold has been plausible deniability. The concept involves designing operations so that the Russian state can more or less plausibly deny being behind them, because there is no direct evidence linking the actions to the Kremlin.

"Today, it appears that the Russian authorities care less about that. Many operations may also be rushed."

But NATO has woken up, and Zysk says that coordination at both national and international level, among other things, has increased significantly.

"But clearly, different countries view this in different ways. That is, where the line is drawn and how strongly one should respond. There are no easy answers."

Next step

What do you think Russia’s next step will be? Will it continue to apply pressure?

"Yes, I believe they will. Russia has limited means of influencing Western societies and politicians. The aim is to exert pressure and intimidate in order to limit support for Ukraine and enable Russia to make progress in the war", says Zysk.

"I see no reason today why Russia should stop. But I am concerned about how far they are willing to go", says the defence professor, adding that it has only been luck that no one has lost their life as a result of Russian attacks against Europe.

No threat

Nevertheless, defence experts largely agree that Putin has limited means and little opportunity to threaten NATO under the current circumstances. They therefore use intimidation tactics and attacks below the threshold of conventional war.

Do you think Putin is a threat to NATO?

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"Russia's use of cyberattacks, sabotage or aggressive influence operations, for example aimed at influencing the outcome of an election in a country, are hostile actions. Whether this can be called war is precisely what is being discussed. Still, that is how it is perceived in Moscow", Zysk explains.

"But if you mean a military attack, I would say that Russia is not a threat to NATO. Russia is not capable of standing against a united alliance unless the Kremlin believes that NATO are not united", she says.

"But if Russia believes it can actually carry out an operation that undermines another country's integrity and sovereignty without it being classified as Article 5, the risk increases. In addition, the danger of war will be greater if the operation can take place without real consequences or without the United States being involved", says Zysk.

If NATO fails to maintain a united front, Russia will have achieved a goal its leadership has long pursued: to undermine the alliance.

Putin's puppet?

Has Trump done Putin's bidding by destabilising NATO?

"A number of actions by the Trump administration have weakened cohesion within NATO. Trust is one of the key factors determining the alliance's credibility and strength. We have seen verbal attacks on Canada and Greenland, among other things, and often a hostile attitude towards Europe. At the same time, Trump calls international law into question", says Zysk.

"I cannot say whether Trump is acting in Russia's favour, but it is clear that Trump's statements may be perceived as beneficial to Russia. Weakening the United States' role in Europe has long been a Russian objective, and that is exactly what we appear to be seeing", she says.

"At the same time, the picture is complex. NATO's defence and deterrence have been significantly strengthened, not least along the border with Russia, and the United States is absolutely central to this strategy. Much of the operational cooperation with the Americans is excellent, including in the High North", says the professor.

"And Washington has confirmed its commitment to Article 5 and to the extended nuclear deterrence that Europe still considers fundamental", concludes Katarzyna Zysk of the Norwegian Defence University College.

Regular contact with Russia

Admiral Giuseppe Dragone, Chair of NATO's Military Committee and “the adult in the relationship”, confirms that there is regular contact between NATO and Russia, precisely to ensure that the situation does not escalate.

"NATO is a non-political military defence alliance. This means that the military side advises the political side. They make the decisions, and we translate their directives into action plans. There is therefore a two-way channel, one political and one military, the admiral explains.

He emphasises that the military contact between the alliance and Russia is no secret.

"We have a direct channel to the Russian chief of defence. We write to each other. It may not be a very professional form of communication, if one can put it that way. But the issue that recurs most often in our correspondence, which takes place several times a year, is escalation management", says the NATO Chief.

"We warn each other that “the limit has now been reached”. It is simply a direct channel for keeping the situation under control", says Dragone.