Russia’s Arctic ‘Shadow Fleet’ Goes Digital as New Putin Decree Tightens Grip on Shipping Data

Russia’s shadow fleet is becoming harder to track not only because of its complex ownership and flag arrangements, but also because of technology designed to obscure vessels’ identities and movements. 

The technical challenge extends beyond simply switching off a ship's Automatic Identification System (AIS). 

A U.S. Coast Guard Cyber Command presentation describes cyber operations aboard dark-fleet tankers, offering a rare look at the technology and vulnerabilities encountered during vessel boardings. Coast Guard Cyber Protection Team members Kenneth Miltenberger and Shane Cancilla detailed their findings at DEF CON 34, the world's largest and most famous hacker convention.

The presentation highlighted techniques including the use of multiple AIS transponders, firmware modification and interference with antenna transmissions. Such methods can complicate efforts to establish a vessel's true position and identity. The broader concern is that digital systems aboard poorly monitored vessels can create risks extending beyond sanctions evasion to navigational safety and the security of cargo operations.

The reported findings also raise questions about potentially dangerous remote-control capabilities associated with cargo handling. 

The findings point to a system in which vessel identity, digital navigation data and paperwork can all be manipulated. Combined with opaque ownership structures, frequent reflagging and uncertain insurance arrangements, these practices can make it difficult for authorities to establish who controls a ship, where it has sailed and whether it is operating in compliance with international rules.

Highly relevant for Arctic navigation

These findings are increasingly relevant to navigation in and surrounding Arctic waters.

The implications are particularly significant for Norway, whose coastline lies along a major route for Russian petroleum exports from the Arctic and the Barents Sea and where sanctioned vessel activity has increased manifold since 2022. 

Shadow fleet tankers also transit waters around northern and western Europe, bringing vessels with uncertain technical condition, ownership and insurance into some of the region’s most environmentally sensitive maritime areas.

Norway’s Coastal Administration estimated that the shadow fleet comprises between 900 and 1,500 vessels. In 2025, it recorded 251 voyages along the Norwegian coast by vessels listed by Norway and the European Union. The administration has warned that aging ships, inadequate insurance and manipulated identities increase the risk of accidents and complicate emergency response.

A further concern is the difficulty of establishing a reliable maritime picture when AIS signals cannot be trusted. Norway and other Nordic countries have already raised concerns about deliberate interference with satellite navigation and AIS, which can affect both maritime safety and surveillance.

A new layer of opacity

A new Kremlin decree restricting access to information about energy exports could add another obstacle for authorities trying to monitor Russian oil shipments through northern European waters.

Putin’s Presidential Decree No. 686, signed on Sept. 28, introduces restrictions on the disclosure of specific information concerning Russia’s fuel and energy sector.

The list includes export cargo names, quantities and prices; sellers, buyers, carriers, freight forwarders and insurers; payment arrangements; transport documents; shipping routes; transshipment locations; destinations; maritime terminals; and the timing of cargo operations.

The decree requires covered information to remain confidential and restricts its dissemination through mass media and the internet, subject to specified exceptions, including disclosure by legal entities about their own activities.

It does not explicitly prohibit AIS transmissions, satellite imagery or commercial ship-tracking services. Nor does it direct vessels to conceal their positions. Its significance for maritime monitoring lies instead in the potential restriction of underlying commercial and administrative records used to verify shipping activity.

Flows become even harder to track

For analysts tracking Russian oil exports, that could mean less access to information about cargoes, counterparties, terminals and voyages. If independently observed vessel movements become harder to reconcile with official export records, identifying discrepancies may require more extensive use of satellite imagery, AIS histories, port observations and other independent sources.

The decree continues the trend of limiting public availability of shipping data in the Russian Arctic. The country’s Northern Sea Route administrator, Rosatomflot, last year ceased publishing daily shipping logs and no longer makes available data about NSR permits. 

An increasing number of vessels have been navigating the NSR with their AIS transponders turned off. The latest example are the Chinese heavy lift vessels Bright and Glory carrying sanctioned equipment for Novatek’s Arctic LNG 2 project.