Deterring Russia in the Arctic: Is it Credible?

Across policy briefs, national security strategies, and op-eds covering northern European security or Arctic security challenges, what seems like a shared and clear goal is the importance of deterring Russia in the Arctic.

On a surface level, this indicates that northern European countries seek to deter Russia from achieving military dominance in the region through which it could project power into the North Atlantic or threaten maritime chokepoints such as the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap. But what exactly do we mean when we describe deterring Russia?

Deterrence is the ability to change how an adversary behaves and convince them to not take an action that you do not wish to be taken. Successful deterrence is thus a negative goal, that you succeed in a deterrence action when your opponent does not do something, deciding that the costs of acting outweigh potential gains. This generally requires three things:

• Capability: the actual physical, military, and other instruments of power required to deny an adversary their goals or impose severe costs through retaliation; 

• Credibility: consistent behavior that shows the adversary that you have the resolve and willingness to follow through, and;

• Communication: the clear messaging of red lines, intentions, and consequences so that the adversary understands the stakes at hand.

Of the three requirements, where does the Alliance stand?

Arguably, northern European states have capability to defend themselves and to deter Russian aggression. All Nordic and Baltic states are members of NATO, which comes not only with the security of Article 5, but the combined capabilities of all NATO members to respond to threats. With Swedish and Finnish accession, this capability has only increased.

Each northern European state has also increased their investment in security and defense over the last five years. For context, in 2025, the Nordic countries reached a combined total spending of $53.7 billion USD, which is more than twice the amount spent in 2020.

This spending is going towards procurement projects such as the new Norwegian deal to acquire six Class 212CD submarines from Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems closely linked to a partnership with Canada and Germany and the Finnish and Swedish deal to jointly procure TrackX Arctic armored mobility vehicles – just to name a few.

Beyond simple procurement, there is increased operational ability to work together in NATO, but also in minilateral partnerships, cooperating on intelligence, all the while increasing presence in the Arctic through the enhanced vigilance activity Arctic Sentry.

An argument could also be made that communicating red lines, intentions, and consequences is also becoming increasingly clear for Russia. One example of this is recent news that has emerged that NATO states were able to counter attempted Russian subsea cable sabotage near to Svalbard.

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Not only was this publicized as a strategic communication but it was also directly brought to the Russian authorities. Beyond this specific instance, signaling is also done via increased exercising between Nordic and other states in the Arctic to illustrate to Russia that Allies will show increased presence in the North.

But what of credibility? Measuring whether a deterrence posture is credible is challenging. We cannot directly see into an adversary’s mindset and be sure that our posture is 100% credible.

This is not a yes or no answer. Certainly, northern European states have been acting consistently that indicates resolve in the traditional military realm through exercises and capability purchases, but what of threats that continue to occur under the threshold?

Hybrid threats are not new to the European Arctic, but their seriousness and degree of intensity have been on the rise across Lithuania, Germany, and other parts of northern Europe. Given this increase in intensity, it could be argued that in fact the credibility of the Alliance faces significant challenges and may not be foolproof.

Low levels of credibility come with downstream challenges.

If credibility is not as strong as we hope it to be, a barrage of other challenges immediately come to the fore. First, alliance cohesion is not only a part of capabilities but also a factor that raises questions of credibility. For example, is it credible that US forces would indeed come to Europe if a European NATO ally was attacked? Traditionally, this would not have been in question.

However, US President Trump has indicated several times that he would not immediately send troops even under emergency conditions. The withdrawal of US troops from Europe also shows Russia that NATO may not be as credible as it once was. This begs important questions about alliance cohesion and what conditions it is premised on.

If it is only the Russian threat that has kept Europe together and the support of the US that underlies the alliance, steps need to be taken now to ensure that cohesion remains strong in the face of potential US disengagement.

This might look like increasing the Europeanization or a European pillar of NATO, or engaging in more minilateral defense groupings to layer defense in a way that Europe is not as dependent on the US as it has been. Such steps are already being taken but whether or not they truly increase credibility requires additional signaling and preparation to show Russia that taking action would be overly costly.

Second, much of the discussion of credibility are centered in the maritime and aerial/space domain. Logically this makes sense, as much of the Arctic is, after all, an ocean and thus presence and signaling happens in a maritime context with aerial and space-based support. Certainly, this should continue to take place.

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However, it leaves the land domain surprisingly secondary when it comes to how it can be part of a credible deterrence posture. Even if a land invasion is not expected in the High North, threats increasingly occur under the threshold of armed conflict that challenge the norms of civilian life.

GPS jamming, disinformation campaigns, and unidentified drones are only some of the threats that require more discussion on what it looks like to successfully deter them. Recently, the Norwegian Foreign Minister Eide acknowledged that Norway is not good at deterring such threats beyond diplomatic messaging.

Increasing credibility then is not just a question of improving situational awareness and increasing presence, but also ensuring that credible deterrence is present in all domains of operation and to threats that are specifically challenging to deter.

The land domain is of relevance here as it is also the domain where we see the most diversity of threats, such as vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, the usage of drones, attacks on sites that house equipment for Ukraine, and a barrage of threats that are constantly innovating and changing.

Don’t ring the alarm bells for the Arctic just yet.

In his initial opening reports at the 2026 Arctic Security Conference, Eide did not just say that hybrid threats are a challenge to deal with, he also said he isn’t ringing the alarm bells for the Arctic just yet. But if we rightly aren’t ringing alarm bells, what we do need to raise attention about is more awareness.

Politicians often speak of situational awareness and point to the acquisitions of space-based and maritime sensors.

Yet, awareness must go beyond this asking why and how credibility is lacking in the current deterrence posture in northern Europe and what must be done to improve this via investing in strengthened alliance cohesion and ensuring that discussions are not limited to only some domains while leaving the centrality of the land domain.

Indeed, the maritime and space domains are where activity is occurring the most, but it is on land where civilians live, where hybrid threats are the most active, and where deterrence must be strengthened.