Russia’s Arctic Oil and LNG Activity Relies on Limited Number of Key Hubs

Russia’s Arctic oil and LNG exports depend on a surprisingly small number of vessels, storage facilities and maritime corridors, according to a new analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), highlighting both the economic importance of the trade and the growing difficulty of monitoring it.

The CSIS Futures Lab estimates that Russia’s seaborne Arctic crude exports have generated about $18.8 billion in gross export revenue since February 2022. Russian fossil fuel exports overall generate an estimated €193 billion ($220 billion) annually, according to the analysis.

The Arctic crude trade is particularly concentrated around floating storage and ship-to-ship (STS) transfer facilities. Two floating storage and offloading vessels, the Umba and Kola, handled an estimated 53% of Russia’s seaborne Arctic crude exports since the start of the war, CSIS found. The Murmansk STS anchorage in Kola Bay accounted for another 24%.

That means at least 77% of sanctioned Arctic crude exports, worth approximately $14.5 billion, passed through just three fixed sites: the Umba, the Kola and the Murmansk STS anchorage. Only 23% was exported directly to international markets without relying on those floating storage vessels or the Murmansk anchorage.

The concentration is also significant for LNG. CSIS, using Bloomberg data, estimates that Arctic LNG accounts for about two-thirds of Russia’s total seaborne LNG exports. Novatek has positioned floating LNG storage units at Murmansk and off Kamchatka to facilitate transfers between ice-class vessels serving the Arctic and conventional LNG carriers.

Norway sits along the route

The geography puts Norway directly in the middle of this maritime system.

CSIS vessel-tracking data show Russian Arctic energy traffic moving from the Barents Sea along the Norwegian coastline before continuing toward international markets. Norwegian authorities have been monitoring the traffic closely.

Norwegian authorities recorded nearly 400 sanctioned vessels sailing along the Norwegian coast during a period of just over a year from early 2025 to spring 2026. The vessels primarily carried crude oil from the Murmansk area and LNG from Arctic terminals, with Vardø’s Vessel Traffic Service continuously monitoring the traffic in international waters.

Kystverket's own 2026 assessment records 251 voyages along the Norwegian coast by listed vessels during 2025 and says many of these vessels have inadequate insurance coverage and likely technical standards that differ from normal shipping.

The Norwegian maritime picture also extends beyond sanctioned vessels. More than 40 times since early 2024, Arc7 LNG carriers serving the Yamal LNG project have stopped in waters off Honningsvåg, according to AIS data reviewed by High North News. These vessels are not currently sanctioned, and the stops are legal under existing Norwegian and European rules.

The calls have been associated with crew changes, provisions and other logistical support.

Honningsvåg has a longer history in Russia’s Arctic LNG logistics. In 2018, Yamal LNG completed its first ship-to-ship LNG transshipment operation near the Norwegian port, transferring cargo from an Arc7 carrier to a conventional LNG tanker.

The distinction is important: Honningsvåg is not currently a hub for sanctioned Russian oil or LNG transfers. But its use as a logistical stop for Arc7 vessels illustrates how Norwegian waters form part of the broader support network for Russia’s Arctic energy shipping.

Arctic traffic goes dark

At the same time, the visibility of some of the most important Russian Arctic energy assets is deteriorating.

CSIS found that observable AIS activity from the Kola and Umba has fallen by roughly 85% from pre-2022 levels. The researchers say the vessels have switched off their transponders or manipulated their signals. In one example, the Kola transmitted a spoofed position placing it off Nigeria while the vessel remained in the Arctic.

The decline creates a growing maritime blind spot around infrastructure that is otherwise highly concentrated and identifiable. It also increases the importance of Norway’s ability to combine AIS with satellite imagery, reporting systems and other sources when tracking vessels along its coast.

Russia is meanwhile expanding its Arctic infrastructure. Satellite imagery analyzed by CSIS shows at least 15 new reservoir tanks associated with the Murmansk LNG project at Belokamenka in Kola Bay. The project, scheduled to begin operating by 2030, could eventually allow LNG to be exported from relatively ice-free Kola Bay without relying to the same extent on scarce Arc7 tankers.

Pressure on the Arctic chain

CSIS argues that Western governments should therefore target the specialized infrastructure that makes Russia’s Arctic exports possible.

Its recommendations include constraining the foreign technology and components needed to build and maintain Russia’s nuclear icebreakers, preventing access to specialized maintenance services and bringing forward the EU ban on servicing Russian LNG carriers.

The researchers also call for expanded satellite and other monitoring of floating storage and STS transfers, with information made public to help insurers, ports and other maritime providers identify vessels involved in sanctions evasion.