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Arctic Circle Assembly 2026:
Defence researcher: Putin is Gradually Raising our Tolerance For War
Reykjavik (High North News): She calls it "salami tactic," where Russia gradually pushes the boundaries of what NATO is willing to tolerate. "It is a process of becoming conditioned to war," says Katarzyna Zysk at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February almost five years ago, so-called undesirable incidents between Europe and Russia have gradually increased.
Katarzyna Zysk, a professor at the Norwegian Defence University College's Institute for Defence Studies, calls it “salami tactics”: a series of incremental actions that are visible, but individually too limited to trigger a strong response.
“You slice off one thin piece at a time, until a new normal is established. Each action can serve as a test of how far Russia can push the boundaries of what its opponents are willing to tolerate without provoking a forceful response. If the reaction is weak, or the costs imposed are not high enough, Russia may conclude that it can push further,” says the defense researcher.
Additional costs
“Consider the incidents involving drones and explosives in Germany. In a different context, this might have been regarded as an act of terrorism. Had similar incidents occurred during the first year of Russia’s full-scale invasion, whether inolving drones or a stray missile landing on NATO territory, the response might well have been stronger."
Zysk argues that Moscow’s objective is to impose costs on Europe while keeping the costs and risks to Russia as low as possible.
NATO is trying to be the ‘adult’ in this relationship
“He is conditioning us to tolerate more,” says Zysk.
Where is the boundary?
HNN meets Katarzyna Zysk at the international Arctic Circle conference in Iceland, where she is taking part in panels and discussions on security and defence.
Among the debates are also discussions about the famous Article 5 threshold and where and when NATO should draw the line on what constitutes an attack on the defence alliance. A threshold that the defense alliance appears continually to push ahead of itself, entirely in line with Zysk’s salami theory.
"This gradual conditioning is taking place while NATO members continue to debate how best to respond. In many ways, NATO is trying to be the "adult" in the relationship, exercising restraint to avoid escalation. Yet the same restraint may be what allors the conditioning to continue."
But this raises a difficult question: had NATO reacted more forcefully to the earlier incidents, would Russia have backed down, or would it have escalated further?
"It is impossible to know with certainty in hindsight."
Manageable cost
But what is clear, according to Zysk, is that Russia does not expect to pay an unacceptable high price for its aggression.
“After each serious incident, Russia appears to conclude that the costs remain too low to deter further action.”
Over time, however, Zysk believes that there will have been enough incidents for them to have a cumulative effect.
Rhetoric
At some point, Russia may cross the threshold into what NATO would inevitably have to consider an Article 5 attack. The question is what happens then.
The incidents are also described and handled differently. Some countries speak of incidents, others of attacks. But Europe is now increasingly converging on the terminology and understanding of developments.
“Numerous Western politicians are now more inclined to see this as part of warfare, which is how Russia has long regarded it,” says Zysk.
Military doctrine
She refers to Russia’s 2014 military doctrine, which placed greater emphasis on non-military measures, such as information warfare and cyber operations. What they have in common is that they remain below the threshold of open military conflict.
“This approach has deep roots in Russian strategic thinking. Many methods originate from the KGB and the Soviet era, while others can be traced back to the Tsarist period. What has changed is the range of opportunities created by new technologies and new forms of social interaction and communication. Since 2014, Russia has employed these methods more systematically, consistent with its broader military doctrine,” says Zysk.
The doctrine identifies the combined use of military force and political, economic and informational measures, including the exploitation of the population’s potential for protest, as a characteristic of contemporary military conflicts.
There have been many such operatins, particularly since the annexation of Crimea.
“But the operations, especially over the past three years, have been considerably more daring.”
In many cases, the authorities know who is behind it.
NATO has woken up
Where do you think NATO now draws the line when it comes to defending itself?
"It is hard to say. Let’s assume we are hit by a cyberattack that knocks out power to hospitals, and that people die as a result. Or that a stray missile enters NATO territory, and this time, lives are lost. What would NATO’s reaction be then? One must also take into account the cumulative effect of all these incidents or operatins", the professor explains.
She says that an important element of Russian warfare operations below the threshold has been plausible deniability. This involves conducting operations in ways that obscure the Russian state’s involvement, making it difficult to establish direct links to the Kremlin.
"Today, however, the Russian authorities appear less concerned with maintaining plausible deniability. Some operations also be conductated hastely. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a large number of Russian spies were expelled from European countries, potentially weakening Moscow’s capacity to plan and carry out such operations."
At the same time, Russian intelligence services have increasingly made use of criminals and other local recruits for espionage and sabotage operations.
"These individuals may have limited or no relevant training, which increases the risk of poor coordination, errors, and unintended consequences."
But NATO has woken up, and Zysk says that the Alliance has strenghten its response, and coordination at both national and international level, has improved significantly.
“However, there are still important differences among NATO members in how they assess these activities, where they draw the line and how strongly they believe the Alliance should respond. There are no easy answers.”
Next step
What do you think Russia’s next step will be? Will it continue to apply pressure?
"Yes, I believe they will. Russia has limited means of influencing Western societies and politicians decision-making. The aim of these operations is to exert pressure and intimidate in order to weaken support for Ukraine and improve Russia’s prospects in the war", says Zysk.
"I see no reason to expect Russia to stop. What concerns me is how far they are willing to go," says the defense professor, emphasizing that in several recent Russian operations, the margins were slim before human lives could have been lost."
Russian intelligence and sabotage operations in Europe have already claimed lives, inclduing before 2022.
"Two people died in the explosions in Vrbětice, Czech Republic, in 2014, and Dawn Sturgess died as a result of the Novichok poisoning in the UK in 2018", Zysk states.
No threat
Nevertheless, defence experts largely agree that Putin has limited means and little opportunity to threaten NATO under the current circumstances. They therefore use intimidation tactics and attacks below the threshold of conventional war.
Do you think Putin is a threat to NATO?
"Russia's use of cyberattacks, sabotage or aggressive influence operations, for example aimed at influencing the outcome of an election in a country, are hostile actions. Whether this can be called war is precisely what is being debated. In Moscow, however, they are viewed as a parf of a broader war against the West.", Zysk explains.
"However, if you are referring to a military attack, I would argue that Russia currently lacks the capacity to prevail in a major conventional war against a united NATO. That does not rule out limited military operations designed to exploit local vulnerabilities, political divisions, or uncertainty about the Alliance’s response", she argues.
"If Moscow believes it can actually carry out an operation that undermines another country’s sovereignty or territorrial integrity without triggering an Article 5 response, the risk increases. The danger of war rises if the Kremlin concludes that such an operation could be executed without serious consequences, particularly without the UnS getting involvement", says Zysk.
If NATO fails to maintain a united front, it would advance one of Russia’s longstanding strategic objectives: weakening the Alliance’s cohesion and credibility.
Putin's puppet?
Has Trump done Putin's bidding by destabilising NATO?
"A number of actions by the Trump administration have weakened cohesion within NATO. Trust is one of the key factors determining the alliance's credibility and strength. We have seen verbal attacks on Canada and Greenland, among others, including often a depreciatning or even outright hostile attitude towards Europe. At the same time, Trump calls international law into question", says Zysk.
"I cannot say whether Trump is intentionally acting in Russia's favour, but it is clear that Trump's statements and actions may be perceived as beneficial to Russia. Weakening the United States' role in Europe has long been a major Russian objective, and that is exactly what we appear to be seeing", she says.
"At the same time, the picture is more complex. NATO's defence and deterrence have been significantly strengthened, not least along the borders with Russia, and the United States is absolutely central to these efforts. Much of the operational cooperation with the Americans is excellent, including in the High North", says the professor.
"And Washington has reaffirmed its commitment to Article 5 and to extended nuclear deterrence, both of which Europe still considers be fundamental for its security", concludes Katarzyna Zysk of the Norwegian Defence University College.
Regular contact with Russia
Admiral Giuseppe Dragone, Chair of NATO's Military Committee and “the adult in the relationship”, confirms that there is regular contact between NATO and Russia, precisely to ensure that the situation does not escalate.
"NATO is a non-political military defence alliance. This means that the military side advises the political side. They make the decisions, and we translate their directives into action plans. There is therefore a two-way channel, one political and one military, the admiral explains.
We have a direct channel to the Russian chief of defence
He emphasises that the military contact between the alliance and Russia is no secret.
"We have a direct channel to the Russian chief of defence. We write to each other. It may not be a very professional form of communication, if one can put it that way. But the issue that recurs most often in our correspondence, which takes place several times a year, is escalation management", says the NATO Chief.
"We warn each other that “the limit has now been reached”. It is simply a direct channel for keeping the situation under control", says Dragone.