opinions
Time to Strengthen the 1920 Svalbard Treaty
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This is an op-ed written by an external contributor. All views expressed are the writer's own.
In 2015, I had a dinner meeting with one of my earliest and most important Arctic mentors, Willy Østreng, the former director general of the Fridjof Nansen Institute in Oslo, Norway.
He has just returned from an urgent meeting in Svalbard regarding the incident involving Russian Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin arriving at the archipelago deliberately unannounced and causing an international Arctic stir, as intended.
Willy had a national news crew waiting to talk with him at his home while we ate, and I asked him in all my naivety, “why doesn’t Norway just update the 1920 Treaty?”
His response was a powerful learning moment for me, stating that, “The 1920 Treaty has a century of important norms and foundational principles that must endure for Norway, and any changes to the treaty could undo decades of efforts and developments”.
That stuck with me and I have struggled with the broader topic ever since. Over a decade later, I hope the following thoughts reflect well on what I learned.
Critical Geographic Point with a Vulnerable Treaty
Often, the first step to understanding the Arctic is to open a map, which is especially true of military matters. In that regard, it should not be difficult to explain the importance of Svalbard (yet it still is).
For Russia, there are very few locations that hold more importance—with the Baltics being one of the most obvious—which is a significant part of Svalbard’s criticality for the Kremlin. The evidence is clear and consistent.
No where else on the planet, outside of Ukraine, does Russia conduct more force projection activities than it does in the Barents region.
This has been a steady-state priority for Moscow for two fundamental reasons, including 1) preservation of the extended layer of defense west of the Kola peninsula and Murmansk, and 2) lines of operation in support of Russia’s freedom of maneuver toward the North Atlantic.
Both are undeniable priorities, backed by extensive logic and reasoning worthy of many studies and publications as well as planning efforts for Norwegian defense authorities and allies.
Given that understanding, it becomes essential to realize that Russia has plans, and will not hesitate, to take over Svalbard as fast as possible should the opportunity and need (according to Moscow) develop.
Militarily, this is a foregone conclusion, based on how important Svalbard would be to Russia regarding a forward position for sensors and operational capabilities that help secure the Northern Fleet’s freedom of maneuver to the North Atlantic and beyond.
For Russia, their main concern is the opposite, involving the opportunity for Norwegian and allied forces to establish a military stronghold, especially maritime, that would effectively develop a new gap that would make Russia’s ability to pass considerably more complicated.
Militarily, this is a planning nightmare as well as wargaming heaven.
To that end, efforts beyond planning have been underway for years by Russia and understanding what this means begins with an awareness of the practice of military planning that involves established phases.
This is not limited to Russia
In this case, hybrid and irregular warfare activities are part of how military planning develops and tracks what is known as shaping operations, which is how activities are conducted to prepare for future phases involving deterrence and seizing the initiative.
This is not limited to Russia, of course, especially as China’s activities in the area must be considered also. This is where the 1920 Treaty becomes critically important, both as a currently exploitable instrument as well as an opportunity to significantly strengthen it.
The Treaty is becoming increasingly more susceptible to adversarial efforts with the main problem being that it has no enforcement architecture beyond Norwegian administration. There are several aspects which provide evidence and inform the issues, including:
There is no revocation clause, which gives Moscow a permanent, state-funded presence on NATO territory that Norway must tolerate.
Non-discrimination (Art. 3) allows the Kremlin to convert every Norwegian act of governance in a geopolitical grievance.
Visa-free entry (Art. 3) circumvents sanctions and allows free movement of people, which is incredibly useful for shaping operations.
Art. 5 scientific research convention was never concluded, allowing for continued self-declaration of research with zero verification.
The treaty still has no meaningful enforceable consideration of maritime zones.
The treaty has no required dispute management or consultative clause, which allows narratives to fill vacuums involving issues.
To be fair, no one could have predicted a century ago the world and the Arctic region that is our current reality.
However, while the instrument remains one of the most uniquely distinct international treaties ever established, there is a need as well as opportunity (fortunately) to strengthen it appreciably through legitimate adjustments in implementation. This is especially important regarding the nearly uncontrolled flow of seemingly obvious dual-use technologies.
A Path to a Potential Solution
To put it concisely, Norway establishes, under existing Norwegian law, a mandatory registration and periodic inspection regime for all technical infrastructure on Svalbard capable of emitting, receiving, sensing or relaying signals or data. It applies identically to every operator, Norwegian state entities included.
Norwegian sites should be inspected first with all results published.
This proposed registration or ‘registry regime’ would be in full compliance of the Treaty already, have the power of being politically pre-authorized, and could meaningfully strengthen Treaty gaps and weaknesses, especially regarding technological enablers of shaping operations.
The scope of the proposed registry regime would be focused on capabilities-based technologies and equipment with thresholds so regulation concentrates on what justifiably matters and can exempt what is not.
Justification for a registry regime is also critical
Examples of appropriate equipment/capabilities include fixed and semi-fixed antennas, satellite ground stations and telemetry stations, radars, lidar and other remote sensing systems, seismic and hydroacoustic capabilities, imaging systems, select UAV, USV and AUV operations, and data links and relay nodes as well as subsea cable landing points.
Exemptions could include consumer devices, ordinary Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, and standard maritime and aviation safety equipment. For registry purposes, existing equipment gets a six-month registration window while all new equipment needs a license before installation.
Registration fields would need to be established but is standard practice enough to develop easily.
Justification for a registry regime is also critical. Article 1 recognizes Norway’s full and absolute sovereignty, subject to the treaty’s provisions. Articles 2 and 3 protect equal access to specified activities while requiring compliance with applicable Norwegian law. A registration requirement that respects those protections therefore implements the treaty’s framework.
The rule applies to every operator on the same terms, with Norwegian state operations inspected first and their findings published first. This approach puts Article 3’s non-discrimination requirement into practice and strengthens Norway’s position against Russian claims of unequal treatment.
Norway already licenses radio frequencies, regulates installations, has fined Arktikugol, owns most of the land, and exercises judicial authority. The registry builds on that existing authority by establishing a regular schedule for exercising powers Norway has held and used for decades.
This is not limited to Russia, or even China also. This regime will apply to all actors on Svalbard.
Clearly, this will not be popular with some. Moscow will denounce the registry as discrimination, blockade and militarization by other means, and state media will run with Kremlin public response intensely.
However, Article 3 obliges Russian nationals to observe Norwegian law as the condition of every right they hold on the archipelago, and Arktikugol is already a licensed, fined and taxed Norwegian-regulated entity that has never once challenged Norwegian jurisdiction in court because it cannot afford to lose.
Beijing will call the registry politicized science and a Western intrusion on research freedom, but its Yellow River Station sits on Kings Bay land under a Norwegian lease, inside a frequency regime Nkom has enforced in Ny-Ålesund for years, and Chinese equipment already appears on the NySMAC list.
Both are likely to conflate issues and demand legal proceedings
China's entire Arctic position rests on being a lawful, transparent, treaty-observing scientific actor, so refusing to declare any appropriate equipment or capability would cost Beijing vital credibility it has spent two decades building.
Both are likely to conflate issues and demand legal proceedings, but every lawsuit Russia or China files is a foreign state operator standing in a Norwegian courtroom, arguing Norwegian law before a Norwegian judge, and win or lose the judgment is one more instrument of sustained administration that international law counts as sovereignty practiced, and an opportunity for Norway to welcome each instance as a gift.
Concluding Remarks
The timing is right. It will take time for Russia to rebuild its previous Arctic capabilities, and the urgency to offset NATO developments connected to the Baltics has the full attention of the Kremlin.
Svalbard is a major component of this situation, sitting right in the middle of the path when the Northern Fleet is deployed to get into whatever fight.
This implementation proposal could enable counter-shaping operation options for Norway, while fully acknowledging the essential importance and dynamics of the northern relationship between Oslo and Moscow.
Strengthening the Treaty through enforcement mechanisms is key and the lessons I learned from Professor Østreng still apply: Norway must preserve the treaty’s foundations while adapting its implementation to current conditions.
A mandatory registry, supported by periodic inspections and applied equally to all operators, would give Norwegian authorities a clearer understanding of the technical capabilities on Svalbard and strengthen oversight of their use.
This offers a practical way to reduce the ambiguity that supports adversarial shaping operations while reinforcing the Norwegian administration on which the treaty depends.
