politics

Russian Fishing Vessels Repeatedly Cross Svalbard Cables, Raising Security Questions

Russia reacts strongly to the vessels of its biggest fisheries companies, Norebo JSC and Murman Seafood, losing access to fisheries in Norway's economic zone and to Norwegian ports. Here is a Russian trawler docked in Båtsfjord, Northern Norway.

Russian fishing vessels continue to operate legally in northern Norwegian waters, but recent AIS tracks show repeated crossings over cables linking Svalbard to mainland Norway. The movements do not establish espionage or sabotage, but highlight concerns over vulnerable subsea infrastructure after Norway previously sanctioned Russian fishing companies over alleged intelligence activity.

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In recent days Russian fishing vessels have repeatedly traveled across the route of the undersea cables connecting Norway with Svalbard, according to publicly available AIS tracking, including the factory trawler Lira, which previously attracted the attention of Norwegian counterintelligence after communications equipment was found aboard the vessel.

The vessels were operating in waters where Russian fishing is permitted under the long-standing fisheries arrangements between Norway and Russia.

Their repeated movements over the Svalbard Undersea Cable System do not in themselves indicate surveillance or sabotage, and there is no public evidence establishing that the vessels were attempting to interfere with the cables.

Dr Elizabeth Buchanan´s areas of expertise are Russian foreign energy strategy, critical infrastructure security and polar geopolitics.

Dual use

But the activity is noteworthy as Norway and its allies have become increasingly concerned about the vulnerability of critical subsea infrastructure to Russian hybrid activity.

“This is dual use challenge in action,” says Elizabeth Buchanan, a polar geopolitics expert at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

She also points to the psychological warfare aspect of dual use activity.

“It’s not breaking rules or overtly trashing agreed norms - but the targeted state would feel uneasy all the same,” she continued.

AIS tracks show Russian fishing and fish-factory vessels including Arctica, Bootes, Mekhanik S. Agapov, Kapitan Sulimov, Lira and Kurshskaya Kosa repeatedly moving across the area of the Svalbard cables in recent days. The vessels’ tracks show multiple passages over the cables rather than a single transit.

AIS tracks of Arctica, Kurshskaya Kosa, Lira, Kapitan Sulimov, Mekhanik S. Agapov, and Bootes with repeated passes over the Svalbard cables (dotted lines on the left). (Source: Vesselspotter on Bluesky)

The purpose of those movements cannot be established from AIS data. Fishing vessels routinely make repeated passes while working fishing gear, and AIS does not reveal what equipment a vessel may have in the water.

Continued fisheries cooperation

The vessels are also not prohibited from operating in the area simply because they are Russian.

Norway and Russia have maintained fisheries cooperation for decades, including through periods of severe political tension. The two countries agreed on a fisheries arrangement for 2026 covering shared stocks in the Barents Sea, including cod and haddock.

Norwegian regulations permit Russian-flagged vessels to fish in designated areas of Norway’s economic zone north of 62 degrees north under specified quotas and conditions.

Norway has nevertheless imposed additional restrictions on Russian fishing vessels since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Not every security challenge in the region can be mitigated with force

Elizabeth Buchanan, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute

In 2022, Oslo limited Russian fishing vessels exempted from broader port restrictions to three Norwegian ports – Tromsø, Kirkenes and Båtsfjord – where they are subject to inspection.

The government said at the time that the measures were intended to strengthen controls while preserving fisheries cooperation with Russia, which Norway considers important for managing shared Barents Sea stocks. 

Blocking Russian companies

In July 2025, Norway went further by sanctioning two Russian fishing companies, Norebo and Murman Seafood, following an EU decision.

The Norwegian government said the companies were linked to a Russian state-sponsored surveillance and intelligence campaign targeting critical underwater infrastructure in Norwegian and allied maritime areas.

Vessels belonging to the two companies were subsequently denied renewed licenses to fish in Norway’s economic zone for 2026. 

A previous suspect

Lira is relevant to that wider security debate, although the circumstances surrounding the vessel remain inconclusive.

Norwegian police inspected Lira and the sister vessel Ester in Kirkenes in November 2022 and found older radio equipment aboard both ships.

The discovery was reported to Norway’s Police Security Service, or PST, and regional counterintelligence officials said equipment capable of accessing military frequencies could provide intelligence opportunities.

The equipment was not, however, proof of espionage. Subsequent reporting noted that the radios were old Soviet-era equipment that had been used widely aboard fishing vessels, including for communications at sea. No public finding established that Lira had used the equipment for intelligence purposes.


AIS track of Lira with several passes over Svalbard cables. (Source: AIS track via Vesselspotter on Bluesky)

Earlier damage

The concern surrounding Russian fishing vessels is nevertheless heightened by earlier damage to Norwegian subsea infrastructure.

In January 2022, one of the two fiber-optic cables connecting Svalbard to mainland Norway stopped functioning. The cable is operated by Space Norway and is important to communications on the archipelago, including connectivity for the Svalbard Satellite Station.

Norwegian investigators determined that the damage was probably caused by human activity. AIS records showed the Russian trawler Melkart 5 repeatedly crossing the cable route in the days before the failure.

Norwegian media reported that the vessel crossed the area more than 30 times over two days, while later reporting put the number of crossings at more than 100. 

The police ultimately closed the investigation because there was insufficient evidence to establish criminal activity. Investigators considered fishing activity, technical failure and other possible causes, and said they had not established a connection between the trawling and the loss of the cable. 

Dual use challenge in action

Elizabeth Buchanan, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute

In 2021, about four kilometers of cable belonging to the Lofoten-Vesterålen Ocean Observatory disappeared from its original position. Researchers later recovered about three kilometers, finding that it had been dragged as far as 11 kilometers from where it had been installed. 

Those incidents do not establish a pattern of Russian sabotage. They do, however, demonstrate the vulnerability of subsea infrastructure in Norwegian waters and the difficulty of determining whether damage is accidental, related to fishing activity or deliberate.

“This also underscores that not every security challenge in the region can be mitigated with force,” Buchanan explains and highlights that even with currently ongoing NATO Arctic exercises Moscow is seemingly not deterred.

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