opinions
From Hormuz to the High North: Why Nordic Hydrogen Is an Energy Security Bet
Published
This is an op-ed written by an external contributor. All views expressed are the writer's own.
Wars reshape energy markets. The 1973 Arab oil embargo spurred the creation of the strategic petroleum reserve. More recently, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine turbocharged European liquefied natural gas (LNG) investment and rewired the continent's energy politics in under eighteen months.
As conflict rages around the Strait of Hormuz, hence, the question is not whether the Iran war will be similarly transformative but which governments move fast enough to turn the disruption into durable strategic advantage.
Part of the answer points north and towards the wind corridors and nascent hydrogen export infrastructure of the European Arctic.
For decades, the case for clean energy investment has been made primarily in the language of climate obligation and adaptation. The Hormuz disruption has demolished that framing's political adequacy. What the crisis has shown is that clean energy capacity is not an alternative to strategic thinking about energy supply.
It is strategic thinking about energy supply. Hydrogen represents one of the most promising ways this logic could materialise at scale once the infrastructure required to realise this potential is constructed.
The Nordics represent one of the most significant underutilised energy assets in the world.
In principle, hydrogen can be stored at scale and transported over long distances in liquid or derivative form, offering the possibility of strategic buffering against prolonged supply disruption and a hedge against energy weaponisation.
The Nordics represent one of the most significant underutilised energy assets in the world. These countries sit atop some of the highest wind energy density zones globally, with coastal infrastructure, low population density, and proximity to European demand centres that are genuinely difficult to replicate.
Equally important, in the current context, is what might be called their political endowment: rule-of-law jurisdictions with transparent regulatory frameworks, credible institutions, and long track records of honouring investment commitments.
Momentum is already building. Finland and Germany have formalised hydrogen cooperation with Helsinki targeting 10% of EU clean hydrogen production.
The Nordic-Baltic Hydrogen Corridor links the region to Central European industrial demand while the EU's Hydrogen Backbone now envisions nearly 39,700km of dedicated hydrogen pipeline infrastructure by 2040.
Last but not least, industrial partners have proposed a €1.4 billion facility in Oulu that could produce up to 80,000 tonnes of sustainable aviation fuel annually using regional hydrogen. These are all active investment frameworks as opposed to distant future potentials or projections.
What they lack though is the political treatment they deserve; that is, classification as security infrastructure, not climate infrastructure, with the urgency and resourcing that such classification implies. The crisis around Hormuz has precisely sharpened this point.
Three considerations make the current moment particularly consequential. First, Russia's energy windfall from the Iran crisis will not last indefinitely but the dependency patterns it reinforces may.
Every month in which European and Asian buyers recalibrate around Russian alternatives is a month in which structural leverage deepens.
Second, the crisis has clarified Asian partner interests in ways that create genuine diplomatic opportunity. Countries such as Japan and South Korea bring world-leading expertise in hydrogen liquefaction, cryogenic storage, and fuel cell systems.
This expertise is a prerequisite for the export logistics that would make Nordic/Arctic supply chains viable at scale. Both countries should be engaged not as future buyers but as co-producers and co-investors with equity stakes in the infrastructure being built.
Serves both their commercial and strategic interest
Third, Gulf cooperation council (GCC) sovereign wealth funds, already active global clean energy investors, have rarely been more motivated to diversify into stable clean energy infrastructure. The Iran crisis has confronted Gulf states with direct evidence of the fragility of the regional order on which their revenues depend.
A structured offer of equity stakes in Nordic hydrogen export infrastructure serves both their commercial and strategic interest in maintaining their privileged positions in global energy markets while simultaneously providing Nordic governments with capital at a scale that accelerates deployment timelines.
Notwithstanding the real hydrogen potentials of the Nordic/Arctic region, the case for Arctic/Nordic hydrogen investment need to be made without illusion. Hydrogen production remains significantly more expensive than fossil-based alternatives.
Permitting processes across Nordic jurisdictions are often fragmented, slow, and poorly calibrated to hydrogen's specific requirements. The infrastructure buildout requires sustained capital commitment across political cycles. There is also a geopolitical complication that requires candour.
Asian states seeking to access Nordic hydrogen via Arctic sea lanes would, in certain routing scenarios, still be passing through Russian-controlled waters of Northern Sea Route.
This does not undermine the case for Nordic/Arctic hydrogen development but it does argue for investing in the diplomatic and infrastructure architecture that would allow a genuinely autonomous Nordic hydrogen system to emerge.
And the chicken-and-egg problem between supply and demand is yet to be fully resolved: producers need committed buyers, buyers need reliable supply.
Still, the Iran war has made the case that renewable energy is not merely a climate instrument but a strategic asset on par with defence. The case for Nordic hydrogen development existed before the Iran war but what the war has provided is the conditions under which that case can be reframed.
Distributed clean energy generation insulates economies from commodity volatility, supply chain disruption, and geopolitical coercion in ways that no amount of engagement with producing states alone can replicate.
The European Arctic and the Nordic hydrogen resources offer a credible alternative; one built on renewable abundance, institutional stability, and genuine strategic partnership.
To have the alternative within reach and to fail to act on it would not merely be a strategic error; it would rather be a choice to remain exposed to the vulnerabilities that crises in places like the Strait of Hormuz continue to reveal.
