opinions
The Lunna House Agreement Has No Arctic Dimension. It Should
Published
This is an op-ed written by an external contributor. All views expressed are the writer's own.
On 4 December 2025, the UK and Norway signed what many rightly called a landmark bilateral defence agreement.
The Lunna House Agreement, named after the Shetland base that sheltered Norwegian resistance fighters during the Second World War, commits the two states to operating a joint fleet of Type-26 frigates, deepens cooperation on autonomous undersea systems, and formalises the year-round training of British Royal Marines in Norway.
It is significant. It is also incomplete.
The agreement is anchored to the North Atlantic. Its primary concern is Russian submarine activity in waters just adjacent to the British Isles; the approaches to the British mainland.
What it does not address is the Arctic.
The critical infrastructure vulnerable to hybrid attacks sits beyond the agreement’s geographic scope
This matters significantly. Russia’s Northern Fleet does not observe the distinction between the North Atlantic and the High North that the Lunna House Agreement implicitly draws. Its submarines operate across both theatres simultaneously.
The critical infrastructure that is vulnerable to hybrid attacks, the cables and pipelines crossing the Barents Sea, sits beyond the agreement’s current geographic scope.
Norway has long understood the High North as its primary strategic concern. That is largely a matter of geography. The Lunna House Agreement, by contrast, reflects a UK that is still catching up: producing a framework shaped more by where British interests are most acute than by where Norwegian security is most exposed.
That asymmetry should be corrected.
What an Arctic dimension would look like need not be complex. Three additions would transform the agreement’s strategic scope.
First, a dedicated High North security working group. A standing bilateral forum for Arctic operational planning and joint threat assessment. Norway already has the institutional architecture for this. The UK needs to match it.
Second, a formal commitment to extend the autonomous systems collaboration into the Barents Sea. The Lunna House Agreement’s uncrewed mine-hunting and undersea patrol capabilities are precisely the tools needed for Barents Sea surveillance. Limiting them to the North Atlantic is a constraint.
Third, a permanent basing arrangement at Camp Viking. Year-round Royal Marine training in Norway is welcome, but Camp Viking remains a temporary leased facility. Sustained Arctic commitment requires permanent infrastructure, not a rotational presence. An Arctic annex should say so plainly.
The window is open.
The Lunna House Agreement was signed at a moment of genuine political goodwill on both sides. That will has not dissipated. The January 2026 UK parliamentary inquiry on High North defence provides an immediate vehicle for pressure on the UK government.
The recent renewal of the Lancaster House framework between France and the UK demonstrates that bilateral agreements can be updated when there is political will.
There is no structural obstacle to supplementing the Lunna House Agreement with an Arctic dimension. Only the absence of a clear demand for one.
Norway calls the High North its most important strategic area. The UK calls itself the Arctic’s closest neighbour. The Lunna House Agreement should reflect both of those claims; not just one of them.
